Two point nine billion dollars on the table, and in North Kivu the cases just keep coming. Quick context before today's news: the Democratic Republic of Congo declared this Ebola outbreak on May 15. It's driven by the Bundibugyo strain, a less common species with no proven vaccine. Over the summer, cases eased in Ituri and Haut-Uele but climbed sharply in North Kivu. The WHO has warned it's still not under control, and some new infections can't be traced to any known contact. You're listening to Ebola Watch. And today, Africa CDC finally says out loud why this spread before anybody caught it. Plus what happens when you actually walk up to a border checkpoint. We'll start with the money, and whether a pledge that big has anywhere to land. News.az, with Ulviyya Salmanli:
The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention said Thursday that $2.9 billion has been mobilized for the Ebola response in Africa amid a rise in confirmed cases in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Africa CDC Director General Jean Kaseya announced the funding following a G20+ Foreign Ministers meeting on accelerating collective action to defeat Ebola convened by the US on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York, Anadolu agency reported.
Okay, the money. We've been following it, most recently East Africa's forty-five million dollar surveillance ask, and now Africa CDC puts a continental total on it: two point nine billion mobilized. The U.S. is at eight hundred eighty-six million of that, the EU about five hundred sixty-eight. And notice who's pumping the brakes. Jean Kaseya announced the figure and then, same breath, said pledges alone won't stop Ebola. Every dollar traced, from commitment to disbursement to services delivered. That's the Director General telling you how to grade him. Which, honestly? I respect. But "mobilized" isn't "spent," and a promised tracking mechanism with Kinshasa and WHO isn't a public ledger I can pull up tomorrow. Right, and where I'd push is treatment. The EU package mentions vaccines and treatment, but I want to see whether any of this two point nine is actually earmarked for access to the candidate therapeutics, or if it's all response operations. Because if detection improves and confirmed cases climb, that's the bill that comes due first. CGTN writes:
At the Kitatumba Ebola Treatment Center in Butembo, 239 patients have been admitted since the facility opened on June 30, including 113 confirmed Ebola cases. 36 patients have recovered, while 104 people with unconfirmed cases have been discharged. Kakule Kihasaki Samson, medical director of the center, said it was too early to conclude that the outbreak was under control.
Let's put North Kivu on an actual map. Butembo's a busy trading city in the province, and one treatment center there, Kitatumba, has taken in 239 patients since it opened June 30. And that 239 splits almost down the middle. 113 confirmed Ebola cases, and 104 people discharged whose cases were never confirmed. Lump those together in a headline tally and you've nearly doubled the Ebola count at a single facility. Thirty-six recovered so far, and the rest aren't all bad news. Some are still in beds. Except beds are the problem. The MSF-backed center in Butembo has 29 of them, and Toussin Selemani says they're running over a hundred percent occupancy, consistently. So this is where that $2.9 billion meets the ground. The medical director, Kakule Kihasaki Samson, says Butembo sometimes records ten new cases a day. Ten a day, into wards already past full, with some residents refusing care. He says it's premature to call this under control, and I'd take his read over any press release. The Trumpet Newspaper Nigeria, with Nicholas Ojo:
Boum said the outbreak involved the Bundibugyo virus, a less commonly detected Ebola species, rather than the Zaire strain that has been associated with most previous Ebola outbreaks in the DRC. According to him, diagnostic kits available in eastern DRC initially could not detect the Bundibugyo virus. He said the diagnostic gap allowed the disease to spread for months before laboratory confirmation triggered a full-scale response.
Nearly five months. This thing was spreading for nearly five months before anyone declared it on May 15, and the reason is the test kits in eastern Congo couldn't see this virus at all. That's Prof. Yap Boum, who heads emergency preparedness at Africa CDC, speaking at Thursday's webinar. This is Bundibugyo, not the Zaire strain behind most past DRC outbreaks. At detection there were eight cases in three health zones. By the time the response scaled up, it was more than two thousand across forty-six. Now it's in sixty-three health zones across seven provinces, the largest Ebola outbreak the country's ever recorded. And stack that on the fact that there's no approved treatment for Bundibugyo. So for months, you had a virus nobody could confirm and nobody could treat. That's about as bad as it gets. So I've got a specific test for the $2.9 billion. How much of it is buying Bundibugyo-capable diagnostics at scale, and is any of it earmarked for therapeutic access rather than just operations? Boum also pointed to insecurity and community mistrust. A kit that works doesn't help much if people won't walk into the clinic. Here's Montage Africa Magazine:
At the Bende-Bende port, in Kinshasa, IOM workers take the temperature of every passenger and collect health information through a traveller health form, with teams conducting an average of around 1,000 health screenings a day. “If a passenger meets the definition of a suspected or alert case, they are immediately referred to the sampling unit to determine whether it’s a case of Ebola, another epidemic disease, or cholera”, said Dr. Primous Godjedo, a health security specialist at the IOM.
Okay, here's the part I actually wanted to see. Bende-Bende port in Kinshasa, on the Congo River: IOM takes every passenger's temperature, has them fill out a health form, and runs about a thousand screenings a day. And the referral step matters. Per IOM's Dr. Primous Godjedo, anyone meeting the suspected or alert case definition goes straight to a sampling unit to sort out Ebola, another epidemic disease, or cholera. A fever at a port gets you flagged. You need the lab to confirm it. Which only works if the test can actually see this strain. After the Africa CDC diagnostic piece we just heard, I want to know which kit that sampling unit is using. Same question I'd put to the $2.9 billion. Big headline number, and here's what surveillance looks like on the ground: one river port, thermometers, paper forms. Kinshasa also isn't where the cases are concentrated, so anyone arguing for blanket travel restrictions now has to reckon with a screening post that's actually operating. Yeah, I'll push a little there. IOM says it's working 'closely' with Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic. 'Closely' is a nice word. If you're a parent with a kid crossing into Uganda, you'd want to hear the port name and the daily screening count on that side too. If you're finding Ebola Watch useful, please subscribe or leave a review wherever you're listening. Reviews help other people find the show, and your support helps us keep bringing you this briefing.
Links to every story are in the show notes, if you'd like to read more about the ones that caught your attention. That's Ebola Watch for today. Until the next episode, take care. This is a Lantern Podcast.